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REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTERS: HOW TO TELL
A GOOD DEAL FROM A BAD DEAL"
MAnviN KELNER*
A LTHOUGH I HAVE PRACTICED LAW for many years, I believe it im-
portant to state at the onset that the views I have expressed in this
article are those of a real estate "tax shelter" syndicator and deal primar-
ily with the business aspects of these transactions. I have intentionally
not discussed many of the substantive tax issues related to limited part-
nerships and tax shelters; many recent articles have done so in great
depth.' It is assumed, however, that the reader generally understands the
basic tax and legal consequences of an equity investment in a limited
partnership.
Most of my experience in dealing with real estate tax shelters during
the last five years has been derived from personal participation in the
syndication 2 of section 2363 and similar kinds of federally subsidized
housing projects. Accordingly, some of my observations would not be
t These remarks were delivered by Mr. Kelner in a real estate transactions seminar con-
ducted by the Cleveland State University College of Law in April 1975, as part of its contin-
uing legal education program.
* B.S.B.A., Ohio State Univ.; J.D., Cleveland State Univ.; Lecturer in Law, Cleveland
State Uniersity College of Law. Mr. Kelner is a principal in Investment Associates, Inc.,
a broker/dealer specializing in the syndication of real estate tax shelters and other real
estate projects.
See, e.g., Bazos, The Limited Partnership as a Vehicle for Syndicated Real Estate In-
vestment: Selected Tax Considerations, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1124; Geller, Deprecia-
tion on Real Estate and its Recapture: Resolving Problems Raised by the 1969 Act, 29
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1033 (1971); Glasser, Gimme Shelter: Reform of Real Estate Tax
Shelters, 7 U. OF MICH. J.L.R. 267 (1974); Ritter & Sunley, Real Estate and Tax Reform: An
Analysis and Evaluation of the Real Estate Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 30
MD. L. REV. 5 (1970). For an excellent discussion of tax shelters, including real estate, see
the JoIrr COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX. (PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMM. ON WAYS &
MEANS), OvERvmw OF TAX SHELTERS, 94TH CONG., lsT SEss. (Comm. Print 1975). For
an excellent review of a particular tax shelter deal, see 1 S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 391-493 (1972 ed.).
2 "In general, a syndicate is any joint venture, a temporary association of parties for the
financing and execution of some specific business project." F. GARCIA, MUNN'S ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCING 719 (6th ed. rev. 1962). Tax shelter syndications
usually are in the form of a limited partnership, because that form, at present, offers sub-
stantial tax planning benefits while affording limited liability to the limited partners. For
a concise analysis of the limited partnership's suitability for tax shelter purposes along with
a discussion of current efforts by the Internal Revenue Service to place constraints on such
use see Weidner, Realty Shelter Partnerships in a Nutshell, 8 IND. L. REV. 899 (1975). See
also the definition of a partnership in Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1 (1972).
' National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 236 (1968). The section 236 program provides
subsidies by the FHA to various groups such as builders selling to non-profit groups at a
fixed profit, investor/sponsors selling to tenant cooperatives at a fixed profit, and limited-
distribution sponsors, with a limited cumulative return on the initially endorsed mortgage
amount, who intend to build multifamily housing for moderate and low income families.
The program is usually financed through FHA insured 40-year mortgages provided by
FNMA or GNMA at rates established by FHA (which may vary from time to time depend-
ing on the market) and then subsidized so that the mortgagor (partnership) pays an effec-
tive interest rate of only one percent. P. DAVID, URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT 272 (1970).
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appropriate when considering an investment in a conventionally financed
real estate project except when so stated.
I would also emphasize that the purpose of these comments is to im-
part basic knowledge to the legal or financial advisor who is asked to
render advice to his (or her) client (who is assumed to be in at least the 50
percent marginal income tax bracket) on whether to invest in a particular
real estate tax shelter syndication. Hopefully, this article will enable
such an advisor to give an informed opinion regarding the investment
without holding himself out as an expert in real estate tax shelters. The
following are my views with respect to important standards against which
one can test the desirability (and wisdom) of a particular real estate
syndication.
I. BASIC FACTORS IN REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION ANALYSIS
A. The Offering Circular
The "face" of a real estate syndication invariably takes the form of an
offering circular.4 This document is the prime "sales tool" for syndica-
tions and is likely to be the only document available to the advisor upon
which to base his opinion. The offering circular is constantly growing in
size and complexity, today averaging approximately fifty pages of solid
legal jargon, aside from the basic partnership agreement 5 and financial
projections.6 These documents are difficult reading and usually impos-
sible for a layman (as well as many attorneys and accountants) to un-
derstand unless they are dealt with on a regular basis. I have, therefore,
4 An offering circular today may have other names, e.g., private placement memorandum,
confidential memorandum, or prospectus. "What's in a name? That which we call a rose
by any other name would smell as sweet." W. SHAKESPEARE, RoMEo & JuLiEr, Act II,
Scene 2.
The tax shelter deal which offers for sale interests (units) in a limited partnership has
been determined to be a security requiring registration of the prospectus with the Securities
& Exchange Commission, under the Securities Act of 1933, unless counsel can find an
applicable exemption. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1971). Virtually every state which regu-
lates the sale of securities has also defined the term "securities" to include limited part-
nership units. For a summary of securities law, exemptions, and liabilities, see R. HAFT,
TAX SHELTERED INVEmNas, TAXATION-SECURITIES §§ 2.02-.04 (1973). For disclosure
guidelines, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1971). See
also R. HAFr, supra, at §§ 3.01-.17. For a sample circular, see R. I-ILr, supra, at App. G.
See also G. SILBERT, TAX StmTrEDm LNvEsmEN-rs 262-85 (1973). See also S. SURREY & W.
WARREN, supra note 1.
5 Partnership agreements should be written as counseling documents to alert the client
to responsibilities and liabilities. Weidner, supra note 2, at 899. For sample partnership
agreements, see G. SILBERT, supra note 4, at 67-69 (1973); 2 J. BARREr & E. SEAGO,
PARTNERs AND PArNERSHIPS, App. 4, at 533 (1956).
6 For a suggested form, see Excerpts from SEC's Real Estate Advisory Comm. Rep. in
HAF-r, supra note 4, at App. B. For California and the Midwest Securities Commissioners
Ass'n proposals on projections, see HAFT, supra note 4, at App. D. The Real Estate Ad-
visory Committee has expressed concern that prospectuses have become devices for protect-
ing promoters, rather than means of informing potential investors. Why else would they
be so redundant? The Committee recommended that the SEC "promulgate standard as-
sumptions to serve as a basis for numerical disclosure of the potential economic results"
of participation in tax shelters, suggesting such standards as useful lives, items to be cap-
italized and deducted, and consequences of dispositions. Dickey, What Lies Ahead for
Real Estate Regulation, 3 REAL ESTATE REV. 13 (1973). Real Estate Guide 60 was re-
cently adopted by the SEC. CCH FED. SEc. L. RE,. 80, 405 (1976).
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focused my comments in this article on those points which are, or should
be, disclosed by the offering circular.
B. Tax Shelters versus Yield Deals
A "tax shelter" deal (not a tax sheltered deal) is one which generates
losses to be used by the typical high income bracket investor to offset
other income on his tax return. A "tax shelter" deal is to be contrasted
with a "yield deal" which is an investment primarily for the purpose of
receiving cash income on the investment. Thus, if the investment in a
deal is $10,000 and the purpose is to receive a yield of ten percent, or
$1,000, as an annual cash flow distribution on the investment, that is a
yield deal - not a tax shelter deal.
The distinction between tax shelter and yield deals is rather clear,
probably more so to laymen than professionals. Rarely in the last five
years has a client of mine expected to receive significant cash flow on a
tax shelter deal; instead, they sought to incur losses to offset other in-
come. Such a purpose involves the use of the term "tax shelter" in a
precise sense.7 A municipal bond, for example, is not a tax shelter de-
vice. It provides tax free or tax sheltered income but it is not a tax shel-
ter because it does not "shelter" other income from the imposition of
income taxes.
Tax shelter means that the investor can use the tax savings "fund"
generated by the tax shelter to make other economic investments which
will produce a meaningful return. This return may be produced in a
variety of ways: It may be produced by reinvestment of the tax savings
in savings accounts, certificates of deposit, and other relatively secure
investments. It may also be used to make investments in common stocks,
thereby enabling the investor to (hopefully) realize long-term apprecia-
tion from an increase in value of the stocks. On the other hand, the
investor may invest the tax savings in high paying, rather high risk,
corporate bonds which may produce a cash yield to him of ten or eleven
percent in today's market. The point is this: If one confuses the motiva-
tion for making the tax shelter investment with the use to which the tax
savings generated by the tax shelter investment should be put, one does
himself and his client a disservice. The sole purpose of a tax shelter, in
my opinion, should be to provide funds to the investor with which to
make an investment that will accomplish an economic gain. Conversely,
the purpose should not be to provide the investor with an opportunity to
realize a significant economic gain from the tax shelter investment itself.
In my experience, when the investor attempts to combine both objec-
tives, the results are usually unfavorable for both. It is my belief that an
investor, and his representative, should make every effort to distinguish
between a tax shelter investment, for which the sole motivation should
be to provide the investor with tax shelter dollars, i.e., an investment
I In the past, the term "tax shelter" has usually been broadly defined to include any
kind of tax-favored investment. See Whitted, Some Rules for the Evaluation of Tax
Shelters, 1976 TAXES 27. This practice will probably continue until the tax shelter-yield
deal distinction becomes more generally recognized.
[Vol. 25:44
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
TAX SHELTERS
fund, and an economic investment for which the purpose is to return to
the investor a fair economic return on his investment.
In stating this, I immediately have visions of all the Internal Revenue
agents in the country converging on my office outbidding each other for
my list of investors. Allow me, therefore, to reemphasize that when I
refer to tax shelter deals, I am addressing myself to low income housing
projects where cash flow returns are limited by law and long-term appreci-
ation possibilities may be limited by the practical considerations inherent
in such properties. Other tax shelter deals, e.g., movies, oil, and citrus
groves, may have great potential economic returns but also have high risks
one would expect to assume in order to achieve such returns.
If a tax shelter is the primary objective of the investor, the risks of
the deal should be as small as possible when compared with the risk one
would assume if yield were the primary objective. The greatest risk in a
tax shelter investment should be the likelihood of the investor remaining
in a high tax bracket during the period the investment is projected to
generate tax losses. Absolute certainty of sufficient income is not re-
quired - only a realistic probability of such income recurring is necessary.
C. Risk of Foreclosure
If the client's investment objective is a real estate tax shelter, the first
consideration, and by far the most important, is the risk of foreclosure.
8
If the risk of foreclosure is substantial, or even a likely possibility, the
advisor must not allow the investor, whatever his income tax bracket, to
invest in the deal even if the return is exceptionally great in terms of
tax shelter. Although one cannot definitely know whether the property
will be foreclosed upon, the advisor should assure himself that the deal
contains important safeguards against foreclosure; some of these safe-
guards are discussed later in this article.
The risk of foreclosure is an equally important consideration whether
one chooses to invest in a yield or a tax shelter deal. Obviously, the
greater the rewards one seeks, the greater the risks one must take in order
to achieve them. Consequently, one might "bend" a little with regard
to risk-taking in the case of a nontax shelter motivated investment in
order to obtain the high yield that is being proffered. The advisor, how-
ever, should not allow his client to make an investment in what he con-
siders to be a very high risk deal - unless the investor specifically states
that he wants to take the gamble.
D. Cash Flow
Net cash flow on a tax shelter investment should not be of significant
interest except with regard to the "hobby loss" provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.9 It is helpful, however, if the project will produce a net
s Foreclosure of the mortgage on the underlying project is probably the greatest risk in
any real estate tax shelter, the consequences of which are explored in depth in Ginsberg,
The Leaky Tax Shelter, 1975 TAXES 719. For the more common reasons for foreclosure in
a section 236 project see Kaster, Subsidized Housing: Facts Versus Tax Projections, 26
TAx LAW. 125, 133-37 (1972).
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 183.
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cash flow that will be sufficient to pay the capital gains tax inevitably due
upon disposition of the investment. Other than that, cash flow is relatively
insignificant. Of course, the greater the cash flow produced by the in-
vestment, the less value it will have as a tax shelter since cash flow will
always have the effect of reducing the amount of tax losses otherwise
available to the investor.
If the cash flow originally projected is not generated, usually only one-
half of the nonrealized cash flow will be lost to the investor because the
tax losses should be greater by an equal amount. Thus, if the investor is
in the 50 percent tax bracket, one-half of the cash flow projections not
actually realized should be available to the investor through additional
tax savings. Remember, it is generally not necessary to assume high risks
in order to produce significant after-tax cash benefits; it is absolutely
necessary to take high risks in order to produce high cash flow.' 0
In a typical yield deal, the net cash flow is of very great significance.
The cash yield on a nontax motivated investment should be at least nine
or ten percent and preferably higher. Although everyone wants the great-
est amount of cash flow on an investment so that an economic return is
secured, it is very important to achieve a return which is in balance with
the amount of risk taken. Over the last few years, more and more deals
have been structured to give the appearance of a good return without
taking into consideration the increased risk to the investor.
The risk of foreclosure is not lessened because investors have a priority
with regard to cash flow. The investor still loses his money if the project
does not succeed. Consequently, in a conventionally financed real estate
project, such as an apartment house or an office building, the cash flow
"priority" to the investor, who is usually putting up all of the equity
money, should be at least ten percent in order to induce him to make the
investment. The effect of a lower preference return to the investor-
limited partner is that the general partners will be too well paid for an
investment opportunity in which they have little or no investment. If the
project is very successful, the developer or other general partner should
share in the rewards of the deal, even on an equal basis with the limited
partners. Yet these rewards should not be forthcoming to the developer
or other general partner until the project has distributed to the investor-
limited partners a return that is commensurate with the risk to which their
investments were exposed."
10 High risk is not necessarily related to high tax loss (i.e., a. large write-off), whereas
high risk is necessarily related to high cash flow (in unseasoned real estate). V. BRUDNEY
& M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPoRATE FINANCE 63-66 (1972). But see Whitted, Some Rules for the
Evaluation of Tax Shelters, 1976 TAxEs 31, 33 for a discussion of a risk-tax loss ratio
which notes the importance of avoiding the appearance of a sham to avoid taxes.
u It is unfortunate that many conventionally financed real estate deals are syndicated as
tax shelters when they contain all of the risks attendant upon high cash flow projects.
Specifically, many offering circulars contain the "magic" language to the effect that "in-
vestment in the partnership is not appropriate to persons whose marginal tax bracket is less
than 50 percent." I do not believe that this language, and its obvious inference that the
deal is a "tax shelter," is appropriate when the deal itself is a high risk in terms of potential
foreclosure and when generation of the cash flow projected is dependent upon the rental of
suites at competitive rates of rent. Moreover, although many of these syndications
contain priorities in favor of the limited partners, these priorities are a two-edge sword in
[Vol. 25:44
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The "quick potential" of cash flow is important in a yield deal. It is
of even greater importance that potential return be higher than historical
return. In other words, if an investment is made in an apartment house
or an office building to be constructed, the priority return to the investor-
limited partners should be significantly higher than the return from a
project which has historical support for the yield that has been fore-
casted for the investor.
Another important consideration in determining the percentage of
cash flow appropriate for the risks of a particular investment is whether
the cash flow is tax-free to the investor and, if so, for how long a period
of time. By this, I do not mean that the investment produces tax shelter
to offset other income of the investor. Rather, the income from the proj-
ect itself might not be taxable to the investor because the depreciation
generated by the property significantly offsets the net cash flow distribu-
tions to be made to the investor-limited partners. A nine or ten year
tax-free return on investment on an apartment house project is "worth" more
than a similar rate of return on a warehouse project (part or all of which
may be taxable to the investor beginning with the first or second year)
because of the long lives assigned to warehouse projects by the Internal
Revenue Service.1 2
In summary, it is not necessary that a successful tax shelter invest-
ment generate a cash flow; it simply must not be foreclosed. On the
other hand, a deal in which an investment is made primarily for eco-
nomic yield must have a large cash flow in order to accomplish the ob-
jectives of the investor. Otherwise the investor will have failed in his
venture, even though the project has not been foreclosed. If both tax
shelter and yield are the objectives of the investor (although it was earlier
stressed that they should not be), and the projected yield is not achieved,
that they not only grant the priority to the limited partner, but also are a "cap" on the cash
flow distributable to the limited partner. This arises because the general partners usually
receive the cash flow generated by the project in excess of the priority amount until they
are "even" with the limited partners. Thus, the investor is exposed to all of the risks
noted above, but the "cream" of the deal, if highly successful, belongs to the developer -
general partner. These deals are neither fish nor fowl and the tax shelter which they
do generate may derive from real losses to the investor and not "paper" losses.
I do not mean to imply that all such structured deals are bad deals or inherently unfair to
the investor. My point is simply that they should not be marketed to investors as "tax
shelters" when, in fact, the risks to which the investment is subject suggest that such deals
are "yield deals." Thus, in my opinion, the cash flow priority to the limited partners should
not be less than ten percent and the language regarding tax brackets should be omitted;
these deals should stand on their own.
12 The partners are interested in the most rapid depreciation allowable. Therefore, it
would be well for them to be aware of the Internal Revenue Code's preference for residen-
tial to commercial buildings. The highest rates allowable are the following: residential
rental (new) - 200 percent declining balance; residential rental (used) - 125 percent declining
balance; commercial (new) - 150 percent declining balance; commercial (used) - straight-
line method. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(j)(1)(B), (j)(2), (j)(4), (j)(5).
But just as important to the investors is the determination of useful life. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service has set useful life guidelines of 40 years for apartments and 60 years
for warehouses. Thus, in determining the depreciation for a year, the investor must
multiply his basis not only by the rate figures but also by the reciprocal of the building's
useful life. See Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 CUm. BULL. 420 and, more importantly, Rev. Proc.
72-10, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 721, containing the ADR classification for useful life of ijiany
kinds of property.
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it is no justification to say that the investor has, in any event, achieved
the benefits of the tax shelter. If the investor had wanted to achieve
only tax benefits, he probably would have been able to make a much
better investment which would have yielded significantly greater tax
benefits for the same amount of money without the increased risks at-
tendant to that particular deal. Thus, a yield deal which has failed to
produce the income objectives of the investor does not usually produce
a good tax shelter when evaluated by the number of dollars invested in
the deal.
E. Long-Term Appreciation
A frequently stated objective of an investor in a tax shelter is to achieve
substantial appreciation of the property during the period the invest-
ment is intended to be held. When analyzing a tax shelter, if comparing
a conventionally financed apartment house (a "conventional project")
with a subsidized housing project (a "subsidized project"), one would
properly conclude that long-term appreciation is more likely in the con-
ventional project. Nevertheless, the prospect of long-term appreciation
is an irrelevant consideration in determining whether to invest in a
particular tax shelter deal. One must always bear in mind that the
purpose of the investor is to provide himself with tax shelter. Tax shelter
does not mean cash flow nor does it mean long-term appreciation. It
should be reemphasized that my remarks are in reference to low-in-
come housing projects with cash flow returns limited by law and long-
term appreciation possibilities limited by the practical considerations
inherent in such projects.
For example, consider an FHA section 236 project to be rented pri-
marily to elderly persons. It is impractical to expect that such projects
will experience significant long-term appreciation. The tenants in such
projects pay a rent for their suites that is approximately 50 to 60 percent
(or less in some projects) of the fair rental value they would pay for
the same suite in the same neighborhood. Such low rent is possible
only when a section 236 or other federal subsidy is available - often
a significant real estate tax abatement is provided by the local community
or the state in which the property is located. It is simply not realistic to
assume that twenty years from commencement of occupancy, one will be
able to refinance the property with a conventional lending source which
would precipitate the loss of the rent subsidy and the tax abatement.
Such refinancing would probably result in a 50 percent increase in rent to
the tenants in the building and consequently, the eviction of people barely
ambulatory and financially destitute.
If, however, the elderly project is generating a cash flow, that stream
of income, which is probably tax-free even to a "second user," would be
saleable at some price. Such income could probably not be capitalized at
more than ten to twelve percent and, therefore, a selling price on such
basis (cash above the existing mortgage balance) would be relatively
nominal when compared to the reproduction cost of the building.
It is not inconceivable, however, that a well-built, well-located federal-
[Vol. 25:44
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ly subsidized family project, attractive when first opened and carefully
maintained, would have a significant value 20 years hence. I have syndi-
cated a number of such projects which I believe will constitute fine,
saleable projects at that time. Nevertheless, I never assign a residual
value of more than one dollar to the property when presenting the Return
on Investment Schedule (Schedule C) to an investor, and I do not en-
courage investors to believe otherwise.
F. Rules of Thumb
There are a number of technical standards against which one can
measure a proposed investment in a real estate tax shelter. I use the term
"standards" in the sense of "rules of thumb"; they are not listed in any
particular order of importance.
1. Loss/Investment Ratio
An important consideration is the ratio of deductible tax losses that
can be offset against other taxable income to the dollars invested. For
example, if one invests $10,000 in a deal, how much loss will be made
available to offset other income on the tax return? Obviously, if
$10,000 is invested and $20,000 of losses in the year of investment is
available to offset other income, that is a rather good ratio of losses to
investments. 13 In the case of an investment paid for in four or five an-
nual installments, this analysis must be made on the basis of the total
losses available over the entire pay-in period.14
Let's look at Schedule B of the projections for 50 percent income
bracket taxpayers. Note that in column (7) (headed "Investments"), the
investment in 1975 was $8,650 (year one of the investment). Moving
to column (2) for the same year, the tax loss was $17,759. In this in-
stance, the investor was provided with a tax loss of approximately 2:1,
a particularly good ratio of losses to dollars invested. Look at the next
year, 1976. The investment was $9,230 and the projected loss was
$18,271. In both years, the 50 percent bracket taxpayer had no out-of-
pocket investment because 50 percent of the projected loss of $36,030
($17,759 + $18,271) is $18,015, $135 more than the investment of
$17,880. Thus, the tax savings covered the entire investment making it
a very deep shelter for the investor in years one and two (and so on down
the line as one reviews the numbers). Most tax shelter investments are
paid in on an installment basis over a three, four, or five-year period
and if the loss-investment ratio during the total investment period aver-
ages 1.5:1 or better, it is usually an advantageous deal, numberwise, for
the investor.
2. After-Tax Rate of Return
Schedule C - 50, at the end of this article, is entitled "Return on In-
13 A loss which is substantially in excess of the investment is sometimes referred to as a
"deep shelter."
'4 Make the analysis on a year-by-year basis and on a cumulative basis over the period of
investment.
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vestment Schedule." The return on investment indicated therein is
28.12 percent, an exceedingly high rate of return and difficult, but pos-
sible, to achieve. It is analogous to the rate of return one would receive
on an investment in a tax-free municipal bond. Moreover, a careful
examination of the schedule indicates that the high rate of return is
achieved after providing for payment of a capital gains tax upon the sale
of the investment.
One could dwell for many pages on the various meanings of the num-
bers in this schedule. What is emphasized, however, is the use of the
schedule rather than its intrinsic meaning. For example, if three deals
are presented to the advisor for consideration and each has a return on
investment schedule prepared in the same manner, it will obviously be
easier to evaluate these deals in terms of bottom-line, after-tax econom-
ics by comparing the rates of return, rather than to examine separately
the importance of any individual numerical standard. Note that the
effect of a return on investment schedule is to distill all of the important
numbers in the deal into a net "bottom-line" result expressed by the
after-tax rate of return. The price paid by the investor to participate
in the deal in relation to the amount of tax losses and cash flow, the
period over which the investment is paid in, and the timing of the re-
turn to the investor of the actual tax savings and cash flow he may enjoy,
are all taken into consideration in the computation of the rate of return
disclosed by such schedule. Thus, a deal priced to the investor at 18
percent of the mortgage may produce a higher rate of return than a deal
priced at 16 percent of the mortgage. This would occur if the lower-
priced deal were to be paid for over two annual installments and the
higher-priced deal in five installments over a 48 month period. The time
value of money,15 therefore, is very important in computing the rate of
return shown by the schedule. This consideration, the "use" of money,
is or should be the primary objective of every tax shelter and the most
meaningful numerical measurement of the investment's value.
In summary, the primary use of a return on investment schedule
should be to compare one deal with another. Its use should also enable
an investment advisor to effectively measure the after-tax yields on par-
ticular deals. Finally, it should disclose the amount of tax dollars ulti-
mately payable upon disposition of the property or limited partnership
unit.
II. TAX SHELTER REAL ESTATE
A. Apartments: Federally Financed versus Conventionally Financed
Depreciation for qualified used residential rental property is restricted
to either the straight-line method or the declining balance method,
using a rate not exceeding 125 percent of the straight-line rate.' 6 In
15A dollar to be paid in the future is worth less than a dollar payable today. For a
further explanation of present value, including charts, see V. BRunONEY & M. CHImBsrEN,
CoiPoATE FNA1cE 32-81 (1972).
18 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(j)(5)(A), (B).
[Vol. 25:44
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contrast, new residential rental property, the original use of which com-
mences with the taxpayer, may be depreciated by 200 percent of the
straight-line rate or the sum of the years-digits method. 17 Since the more
advantageous "first user" depreciation is available only for newly con-
structed apartment houses, the following discussion will be confined to
various types of new residential property.
There are two kinds of apartment house projects that can be consid-
ered tax shelters: federally financed and conventionally financed proj-
ects. Federal projects are of two basic types: subsidized and nonsub-
sidized, both of which are financed with forty-year mortgages provided
by the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) or the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association (GNMA).18 Those multifamily
housing projects referred to as subsidized are described in section 23619
and section 221(d)(3) 20 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968 and, more recently, by section 8 of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974.21 All of these projects provide housing for low
and moderate income families who qualify on the basis of their annual
incomes.2 The government subsidy comes in the form of rent supple-
ment payments made directly to the mortgagor (usually about 70 percent
of the market rental value determined by FHA) in the section 221(d)(3)
program. Section 236 projects are financed with FNMA or GNMA at
an interest rate fixed by FHA, but FHA subsidizes all interest payments
in excess of one percent.23 The savings in debt service thus provided
by the lower interest rate is passed on to the tenants in lower rentals
(usually two-thirds of market rental value). These FHA-insured per-
manent mortgages impose no personal liability on the owner of the
property. 24 Rents charged to tenants and cash flow distributed to the
owner are controlled by FHA as are many other matters relating to the
operation of the property.
17 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(b)(2), (3), (j)(2)(A).
i8 FNMA was originally authorized by the National Housing Act. Under the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 18,
20, 31, 38, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.), the assets and liabilities of FNMA were transferred to a private
corporation of the same name. Certain of its former responsibilities were assigned to a
newly created corporation, GNMA, which is financed by the federal government. See H.
HOAGLAND & L. STONE, REAL ESTATE FINANcE 534-51 (1973).
,9 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970).
20 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1970).
The section 221(d)(3) mortgage insurance program is almost always combined with section
101 of the National Housing Act which provides for rent supplement payments to eligible
tenants. The effect of these two programs is to enable qualified tenants to pay only ap-
proximately 30 percent of the fair rental value of the suite or 25 percent of their income,
whichever is greater.
21 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 20, 31, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
22 The intent of Congress in enacting section 211(d)(3) and section 236 projects was to
provide rental housing for families whose incomes were too high for public housing but too
low for standard housing. 2 U.S.C. CONG. & AVmiN. NEws 2894, 9017H CONG., 2D SEss.,
1968. This housing is for low and moderate income persons; it should never be considered
that such housing is low-cost.
2' See P. DAVID, URAN LAND DEvELoPmErT 272 (1970).
24 Id. at 278; Halperin & Tucker, Low Income Housing (FHA 236) Programs: One of
Few Tax Shelter Opportunities Left, 36 J. OF TAx. 2 (1972).
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Typical of the nonsubsidized federally financed projects are section
20725 and section 221(d)(4)28  projects. Section 207 "luxury-type"
apartment projects are designed to facilitate the production of hous-
ing at middle and upper-middle income levels. Section 221(d)(4) proj-
ects give priority in occupancy to middle income families displaced by
urban renewal but, in fact, are not located in urban renewal areas and
are rented to all applicants. Both are rented at fair market rental rates
with mortgage interest payments at current interest rates. Although
rents are controlled by FHA, cash distributions to owners are not so
limited.
It is not my purpose here to elaborate on the different kinds of fed-
erally financed housing projects except to make this comment: Section
236, section 221(d)(3), and section 8 subsidized projects are usually
much lower risk investments than either the federally financed nonsub-
sidized projects or conventionally financed housing. This is a result of
the substantially lower rents charged tenants in these projects. There-
fore, a well-managed project in an appropriate location is more likely
to remain rented to capacity. 27
As stated at some length above, because of the higher risks in a con-
ventionally financed apartment project, the motivation for investing in
them should be to secure a good monetary return on the investment.
Notwithstanding such motivation, substantial (if not "deep") tax shelter
will be afforded to the "first user" as an incident of ownership.2 8 Con-
sequently, the investor may not need to seek a tax shelter investment
if the tax shelter is already being provided by an investment made for
yield purposes.
The nonsubsidized section 221(d)(4) and 207 projects make excel-
lent tax shelters except that the risks taken are at least as great as those
taken with conventional apartment projects because rental is at market
rates. I would point out, however, that these projects provide substan-
tially greater tax benefits than conventionally financed housing projects.
They are thus considered by many to be worthy of consideration as tax
shelters even though the risks are substantially greater than those of
subsidized housing projects.
25 12 U.S.C. § 1713 (1970).
26 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(4) (1970).
27 A recently syndicated subsidized project in Tampa, Florida will demonstrate this
point. Tampa, at the time of this syndication, had a vacancy factor of 13.5 percent in
conventional projects. On the other hand, almost every subsidized project in the area had an
average waiting list of approximately 20 to 25 percent of the total number of units avail-
able for rental in each such project. As the units in the project which I syndicated became
available for occupancy in the summer of 1975, it became obvious that the units were being
rented so quickly that the projections which had been made regarding .the tax losses in 1975
and 1976 were likely to be lower by approximately 10 percent than would have been the
case had the project filled up in accordance with the original rental schedule established
for that project. In my opinion, upon completion of the rent-up of this project, there will
probably be a waiting list of approximately 20 to 25 percent of the total number of units
available for rental. This should be the case in every instance if the project is well con-
ceived, well constructed, well located, and well managed. Obviously, the risk of foreclosure
in this project is significantly less than it would have been if it were a conventional
project.
28 Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(j)(2)(A), (b)(2), (b)(3).
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There are three reasons why such projects provide greater tax bene-
fits. First, like practically all subsidized projects, the amount and
character of the financing costs2 9 of these projects are significantly
greater than with conventional projects; consequently, the tax losses
over the first several years are significantly larger. Second, the prices
at which these projects are traditionally offered is such that the investors
receive a great deal more leverage 0 than had they purchased an interest
in a conventional project. The third factor relates to the 40-year term of
mortgages insured under FHA programs, as opposed to conventional
projects in which the mortgage term is only 25-30 years.
There are several specific tax benefits available only to subsidized
federally financed apartment projects. First, the recapture of deprecia-
tion on property constructed or acquired by the investor before January 1,
1976, is completely eliminated after a holding period of ten years; other
residential rental property is subject to a 16 2/3 years holding period.31
Second, there may be a "rollover" of the realized gain when the pro-
ceeds from the approved sale 32 of a section 236 or 221(d)(3) project
are reinvested in a similar project within a limited period of time.33
Third, as previously mentioned, there are usually more "soft dollar" de-
ductions3 4 in the first several years of subsidized rather than conven-
tional projects, thus creating more tax deductions per dollar of invest-
ment. These three factors, however, are not critical.
Aside from the lower risk, the most important reason why an FHA
project is a better tax shelter than a conventionally financed project is
the length of the mortgage term. In an FHA insured project (with or
without subsidy), the length of the mortgage term is 40 years; in a
conventionally financed project the mortgage term is generally between
25 and 30 years. This difference means that in the longer mortgaged
19 E.g., construction financing fees, commitment fees to the permanent lender, and
mortgage insurance premiums. See, e.g., Kaster, Subsidized Housing: Facts versus Tax
Projections, 26 TAx LAw. 125, 129-30 (1972).
30 Leverage here refers to the ratio of investment to loss. In a conventional project, the
price to the investor is usually 25-35 percent of the mortgage whereas in those projects
financed by FNMA and GNMA, the price to the investor is usually 15-20 percent of the
mortgage. Thus, because depreciation is computed on the total cost, the deductions per
dollar of investment (investment equity) are greater in a federally financed project (as
well as the "soft costs" such as construction interest and financing fees).
3' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(a)(1)(c)(ii). After January 1, 1976, the required
holding period will be the same as that for conventionally financed projects (i.e., 16 2/3
years).
32 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1036(b)(2). An approved sale must be to the tenants or
occupants or an organization formed for their benefit.
3 "At the election of the taxpayer, gain from such approved disposition shall be recog-
nized only to the extent that the net amount realized on such approved disposition exceeds
the cost of such other qualified housing project." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1039(a)(2).
The basis of the newly acquired project is its cost reduced by the amount of the gain not
recognized on the earlier disposition. IM. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1039(d). Section 1039
was added December 30, 1969 and since most projects syndicated to date would still be
viable tax shelters, it is doubtful whether anyone has had reason to voluntarily transfer their
investment under this provision.
34 "Soft dollar" deductions are characterized as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses as opposed to capital expenditures and thus are currently deductible. Compare
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 161, 162(a) with id., § 263.
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project, the tax shelter will not completely expire for a period of 18 to 20
years after investment; whereas the tax shelter with a 25 to 30 year
mortgage will expire in eight to ten years.35 This is of prime signifi-
cance because in the case of a tax shelter investment, the most im-
portant single factor (in fact, the sole reason for making the investment
in the first instance) is to have the use of the money over a long period
of time.36 The longer the period of time during which the investor can
reinvest his tax savings, the more return he will show from that invest-
ment. It is not important that the loss in the nineteenth or twentieth
year of an FHA insured project is, for example, only $100 in the case of
an individual limited partnership unit; what is important is that there is
no taxable profit.
B. Commercial Real Estate
Commercial real estate includes office buildings, warehouses, fac-
tories, shopping centers, and the like. These kinds of projects, in my
opinion, should not be marketed as tax shelters even though they may
provide tax shelter as an incident of investment. The amount of tax
shelter provided to the investor, compared with the amount of dollars
invested in the project, is such that it would take from eight to ten years
(longer in many cases) to recover the investment solely from the tax
benefits.3 7 Consequently, they should not be considered as tax shelters
except in one case; In rare circumstances, there may be an investor who
has a substantial increase in income over a one or two year period in an
amount greatly in excess of his average income. The deductions provided
by a newly constructed commercial property over the first two years, de-
rived primarily from construction interest and construction financing
costs, will provide significant tax shelter during the years in which that
particular investor requires the tax shelter. Additionally, it will provide
a significantly lower amount of tax shelter in succeeding years when the
requirement for such tax shelter is diminished. With this one exception,
I would not recommend commercial real estate as a tax shelter invest-
ment.
a5 In the operation of a real estate investment, the most significant cash paid expense
which is not deductible is repayment of principal. The only deductible expense which
does not involve an ultimate cash outlay is depreciation (hence, sometimes characterized
as a "paper loss"). Therefore, as long as depreciation exceeds repayment of principal,
deductions exceed cash outlay and a tax shelter exists. In a level payment mortgage,
the length of time over which this desired relationship will exist increases as the length of
the mortgage increases.
3 Of course, the disadvantage of a 40 year mortgage in the case of a subsidized
project is that at the time of disposition there is little amortization of principal of the mort-
gage which will have occurred over the first 20 years of the project. My calculations
indicate that in the case of a 40 year, 7 percent mortgage, only 16.5 percent of the original
mortgage amount has been amortized over the first 20 years whereas in a conventional
project, approximately 50 to 60 percent of the original mortgage amount has been amor-
tized. Principal amortization, however, should not be the primary objective of an investor
who is seeking tax shelter.
37 It must be remembered that depreciation for new nonresidential realty is limited to
150 percent declining balance. Irrr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(j)(1)(B).
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C. State Housing Agency Deals
State housing agency deals, in combination with a section 236 sub-
sidy 8 or section 8 rental assistance payments,39 are often better tax
shelters than straight FHA section 236 or section 8 deals because they
usually have more financial controls built into the project and therefore
afford more financial protection against mortgage foreclosures. Michi-
gan State Housing and Development Authority40 deals, for example, are
usually the best because they have particularly unique protections
structured into the financing to safeguard against foreclosure such as
the Equity Escrow Fund and the Development Cost Escrow Fund.
On the other hand, most state housing agency deals offer slightly
less tax benefits in the early years because a lesser amount of fees is
paid to the state agency which would otherwise be amortized over the
construction period.4' This difference, however, is not terribly signifi-
cant, and therefore, such projects usually command the same price as
straight FHA section 2364 deals.
III. THINGS TO LOOK FOR AND LOOKOUT FOR IN TAX SHELTER DEALS
A. The General Partner
The most important nontax consideration in a tax shelter investment
is the general partner of the limited partnership. One must first con-
sider his track record, that is, has he constructed and managed similar
kinds of properties or is this his first attempt at a subsidized project. 43
Second, the net worth of the general partner is very important. Here
I am not concerned with the guidelines set forth in Revenue Procedure
72-13;4 4 in fact, I am offended if a corporate general partner has been
-1 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970).
39 12 U.S.C. § 1706 C (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1706 C (1970).
40 See MicH. Comp'. LAw § 125.1401 et seq. (1967).
41 See e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-172, 1975 IMT. REV. BU.L. No. 19, at 17.
42 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970).
SVan Camp, Living with Tax Shelters in California: A Discussion of the New California
Real Estate Syndication Rules, 7 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 403, 405 (1973).
44 Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 735, sets forth the conditions which must be satis-
fied before the Internal Revenue Service "will consider issuing advance rulings concerning
classification of organizations as partnerships . . . where they are formed as limited part-
nerships and a corporation is the sole general partner." The basic conditions are: (1) the
limited partners will not own more than 20 percent of the stock of the corporate general
partner and (2) the net worth of the corporate general partner, based on fair market value,
must be a minimum of 15 percent of the total contributions or $250,000, whichever is
less (if total contributions exceed $2,500,000, the net worth must be at least 10 percent of
such contributions).
The syndicator must be aware of and plan to avoid the adverse tax consequences that
may arise when the sole general partner in a limited partnership is a corporation. See
Phillip G. Larson, 65 T.C. No. 10 (Oct. 21, 1975), opinion withdrawn, P-H TAX CT. REP.
& MaaM. DEC. 65, 10 (1975), second opinion issued, CCH TAX CT. REP. 7393 (1976);
Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The following four characteristics
are analyzed to determine whether a syndicate should be taxed as an association or a part-
nership: (1) continuity of life; (2) centralization of management; (3) limited liability; (4)
free transferability of interests. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 to-3 (1960). For a discussion of
the application of these characteristics see Fitzpatrick, The Critical Uncertainty of the Tax
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formed by the developer solely for the purpose of meeting the minimum
net worth required thereunder. I am interested in a substantial net
worth, a significant portion of which must be in liquid assets. A net
worth of $1,000,000 substantially all of which is represented by nonliquid
real estate, is not a meaningful net worth. The problem is that when
one is in the position of having access only to an offering circular which
indicates a gross net worth figure for the general partner, if any at all,
it is difficult to make a judgment on this point. One is entitled, however,
to ask for the financial statements of the general partner and form his
own opinion. If one has some faith in the syndicator of the project, one
may rely on his analysis of the financial statements to provide the
security to which one is entitled. In any event, the important thing to
remember is that the general partner must have a substantial net worth
in relation to the size of the project.
I am also interested in the organization of the general partner. From
time to time, investors and their representatives complain to me about
the many facets of a project which are controlled by the general partner.
Architects, insurance agencies, management companies, and mortgage
brokers are frequently controlled by the developer. I do not object to
these entities being controlled by the general partner; in fact, I welcome
them. In my opinion, it is to the advantage of the investor to have
the general partner control as many facets of the deal as is consistent
with the type of project. The more aspects of the project controlled
by the general partner, the more incentive the general partner will have
to make the project a success. If the project is a success for the general
partner, it will be a success for the limited partner providing it has been
properly and fairly structured. If the general partner has control over
other facets of the project, it will enable the developer to demand that
the proper priority be given to the project's activities. This might not
be the case if the service were being provided by an independent party.
For example, the timing in an FHA project is often so critical that the
failure to abide by the finest detail of FHA regulations may have the
effect of seriously hampering the deal, if not killing it altogether. 45 If
the general partner controls the architect, the mortgage lender, and the
management company, he can control and direct the attention of these
entities to the timing required for that particular project.
In most cases, when the general partner controls these other entities,
he will have available to him an expertise not usually available from in-
dependent parties. An insurance agency which is not familiar with the
insurance coverage of subsidized projects will not be able to provide the
same service to such projects as if it were its tenth such endeavor. Ob-
viously, the same is true of an architect who has previously constructed
Status of Public Real Estate Syndicates, 48 ST. B. CAL. J. 238 (1973); Halperin & Tucker,
Low Income Housing (FHA 236) Programs: One of Few Tax Shelter Opportunities Left,
36 J. TAX. 2 (1972).
15 See generally Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z
(1970); W. BEATON, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 103-08 (1975); R. RATCLIFF, REAL ESTATE
ANALYSIS 160-63 (1961); Halperin & Tucker, Low Income Housing (FHA 236) Programs:
One of Few Tax Shelter Opportunities Left, 36 J. TAX. 2 (1972).
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plans for the FHA and knows the FHA requirements. In my experience
with both kinds of persons in FHA processing, I can assure one that it is
to the investor's advantage to have expert help in these areas. If these
areas are controlled by the general partner, the expertise will usually be
there.
One other fact regarding this point of control is that the more money
the general partner can make on a project, the better it is for the inves-
tors. The profit generated by the developer by supplying these other
services to the project is not money that is being generated from the in-
vestor. It is not a profit which results in a higher price to the investor.
The more money the developer makes, the stronger he will be financially.
The stronger the general partner, the better off the investor. It is not
important to "look down the throat" of a developer; it is important to
determine if the investor is paying a fair price for his interest in the proj-
ect.
In every case, the general partner must guarantee completion of the
project in accordance with the plans and specifications and to the satis-
faction of the lender. This guarantee must be absolute, unconditional,
unlimited in amount, and backed by a substantial net worth. A 100 per-
cent payment and performance bond is not, in my opinion, a substitute
for a strong net worth. Of course, for additional security, I will insist
upon the bond or letter of credit, but usually these will have already
been required by the lender.
B. Operating Deficit Provisions
The general partner must be obligated to guarantee against operating
deficits. 46  This may take the form of a guarantee against default for a
certain period of time following the permanent loan closing.47  Under
such an arrangement, the general partner may be obligated to fund all
operating deficits for three or four years following permanent loan clos-
ing. This is obviously the best kind of guarantee. Alternatively, the
general partner may agree to loan the partnership a sum certain for a
fixed period of years, e.g., an undertaking to loan the partnership up to
$300,000 to fund operating deficits during the first three years fol-
lowing permanent loan closing. One must determine by reference to
the operating expenses48 set forth in the offering circular whether the
undertaking of the general partner is sufficient for this purpose. An
undertaking to loan up to $100,000 to a partnership for a period of three
46 An operating deficit occurs when the operating expenses, including debt service
for this purpose, exceed current income. As used in this section of the article, an operating
deficit is equivalent to a negative cash flow, i.e., cash disbursements exceed cash
receipts.
'7 The permanent, long-term mortgage, not the loans used for financing during construc-
tion.
I E.g., Schedule A, Column (6) less Column (2) plus principal payments. Depreciation
is deducted from total expenses because it is a noncash expense. Principal payments must
be added back because they are nondeductible cash outlays. These adjustments yield the
total cash outlay required for each year. One must also take into account a section 236
subsidy which will be payable to the mortgagor and therefore reduce the debt service.
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years following permanent loan closing is probably not adequate if the.
operating expenses and debt service for the project will aggregate
$500,000 per annum (after taking into account the federal subsidy).
Such an undertaking by the general partner may not be adequate to
cover operating expenses for more than three or four months of the rent-
up period.
C. Conditions of Payments
In tax shelter investments, the investor usually pays his contribution
to the limited partnership over a three, four, or five year period.
49 Of
course, every installment payment falling due after the "final endorse-
ment" date should be conditioned on the occurrence of that event.
Moreover, every installment payment should be conditioned on other
obvious but often overlooked factors, e.g., no material default by the
general partner under any agreement or other document such as the
partnership agreement, note, mortgage, or FHA Regulatory Agreement,
and no material breach of representations and warranties by the general
partner under the partnership and other agreements.
In addition, it is customary to condition the last installment or two
on the occupancy or break-even point of the project. 50 In this regard, it
is important to note what kind of project it is. For example, an apart-
ment project for the elderly normally will not have a rent-up problem so
a condition on occupancy for that type of project is not meaningful. In
this situation, it may be necessary to impose a break-even condition for
the last payment or two, requiring the property to have "broken even"
for the six month period preceding the due date of the installment (as-
suming all operating expenses have been computed on an annual basis).
It is not necessary, however, to secure a condition on the payment of
an installment if the general partner is exceptionally strong and has
made an absolute undertaking against default for a reasonable period
following permanent loan closing or has combined several such under-
takings to protect the limited partner. In any event, a condition on pay-
ment by the investor is not a substitute for a guarantee of completion or
an agreement to make operating deficit loans. These assurances
should be present in almost every project. An escrow of part of the in-
stallment payments received from the investor against the general part-
ner's obligations may be appropriate in certain cases.
D. Location of Property
The location of the property is very important,5' but because one is
only in the position of reviewing an offering circular presented by a
4 E.g., Schedule B, Column (7).
50 "Break-even" in this section of the article refers to a zero cash flow position. Thus,
if cash receipts (rental revenues) equal cash disbursements (operating expenses including
payments on principal and interest on long-term debt), then the project has broken even.
Stated another way, the project does not have an operating deficit.
, Location is important in the sense that real estate is not a liquid asset and there may
not be a ready market when the seller is prepared to sell it. The location may have a great
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client, one is usually not able to make an informed judgment regarding
viability of the location. If familiar with the city, one may make some
very gross judgments such as whether the project is located in a declin-
ing area, what kind of competitive properties are nearby, whether there
is adequate shopping, churches, schools, and so forth. Some of this
information will be in most offering circulars.
E. Additional Protection for Investors
There are additional safeguards that will be helpful to investors and
of which one should be aware. There should be a provision that if there
is a significant reduction in the amount of the permanent mortgage
placed on the property at completion, the purchase price to the investor
will be proportionately reduced. If, for example, the mortgage amount
is supposed to be $3,500,000 and the permanent mortgage is in fact
only $3,200,000, the leverage 52 for the investor (and the resultant tax
loss) is not as great. Accordingly, the purchase price should be reduced
by whatever percentage decrease the original mortgage amount ex-
perienced.5 But I usually do not request a reduction in price unless
the reduction in the mortgage exceeds three to five percent of the origi-
nal mortgage amount. In other words, a de minimis change will not
materially affect the numbers originally projected for the investment
and should not be a cause of concern to the investor.
Since in most instances the investor is making his purchase prior to
having the permanent mortgage placed on the property, the investor
should have an option to cause the general partner to repurchase his
interest if the permanent mortgage has not been placed on the property
by a certain date. I usually seek to have this option made available to
the investor when the permanent mortgage is not placed on the prop-
erty within one year after the expected date. It is necessary to give the
developer some leeway because he cannot control every event which
occurs during the construction period. If, however, the permanent
mortgage is not placed on the property within some reasonable time
after it was supposed to have been, there may be a significant problem
in ever placing the mortgage on the property. An option to sell back to
the developer protects the investor in this situation.
bearing on the marketability of the property. The property is also subject to geographic
obsolescence which relates to the condition of the neighborhood. See S. FRESHMAN,
PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION 55 (1971); R. RATCLIFF, REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS
62 (1961).
52 The use of debt provides two benefits, "the first being an economic benefit and the
second being a tax benefit." JoNrr Comm. ON INr. REv. TAX., 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
OVERVIEW OF TAX SHras 3 (Comm. Print 1975). The economic benefit arises from
the fact that when debt is used in place of equity, the investor has available for alternative
use funds that would otherwise have been needed for use by the limited partnership.
The tax benefit is based on the principle that debt is treated as equity for tax purposes,
i.e., an investor will receive the benefit of depreciation and other deductions over and
above his actual investment. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). The rate of re-
turn on investment varies with the amount of debt or leverage used.
- In Schedule B, if the original mortgage ($4,311,100) were reduced by $517,000, the
original total investment amount of $776,380 should be reduced by 18 percent of $517,000
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F. Price Paid by Investor5 4
A good, subsidized project should usually cost the investor between
16 and 18 percent of the mortgage amount. For example, if the per-
manent mortgage is originally projected at $3,000,000, the price to be
paid by all investors (the limited partners) should be $480,000 to
$540,000. I believe this price will probably increase to 19 or 20 percent
of the mortgage amount in the near future because good, subsidized
projects are becoming very scarce indeed. 55
There are many factors important enough to affect the price. An
exceptionally strong general partner is worth a premium of one or two
percent of the mortgage amount. Conversely, a weak general partner
is worth nothing. As I stated earlier, I consider this factor to be the most
important of all.
It is also important to know whether the project is designed for fam-
ily housing or housing for the elderly. If the project is for the elderly, it
will usually be disclosed in the offering circular. An elderly project, in
my opinion, is usually worth one or two percent more than a family
project. The large group of available tenants assures easy rent-up,
lower overall maintenance costs, and general stability of the project.
Consequently, the risk of foreclosure is usually significantly less in an
elderly project and the tax benefits are more assured over the long run.
The longer the period over which the purchase price is to be paid in,
the better for the investors and consequently, the higher the price. An
investment payable over four annual installments is usually worth at
least one percent more than a deal payable over three years. Because
the objective of the investor is to secure tax benefits, longer installment
payments will usually increase the amount of leverage, that is, tax loss
per dollar in each year of investment.5
6
A deal which allocates 99 percent of the tax losses and cash flow to
the limited partners is worth more than a deal that provides 90 percent
of such losses. I have noticed that people tend to overlook this point
and accept as normal whatever allocations are made in the partnership
agreement. Prices of similar deals should be compared on the basis of
an allocation of the same percentage of taxable profits, losses, and cash
($93,060); thus each of the 22 limited partnership units should be reduced $4,230 to
$31,060. If the purchase price is not reduced, the actual investment represents a greater
proportion of the total capital and debt; the price is consequently higher, e.g., 20.5 percent
of the mortgage ($776,380 divided by $3,784,000) as compared to 18 percent ($776,380
divided by $4,311,100). In other words, the leverage is decreased. This in turn causes a
decrease in the rate of return because less deductions are available to apply against the
same actual investment. Thus, the return on investment of 28.12 percent noted on Schedule
C would decrease significantly.
s4 The price paid by the investor is one of the variables that determines his rate of return.
In Schedule B, assuming all the other variables are constant, as the purchase price of one
unit of $35,290 increases, the return on investment of 28.12 percent per Schedule C de-
creases and vice versa. Thus, the return on investment varies inversely with the purchase
price.
55 See generally S. FRESHMAN, supra note 51, at 26-27.
56 When viewed from the perspective of the individual year, rather than the total twenty-
year period in Schedule B, leverage (in this sense) in 1975 through 1981 is increased because
the proportion of actual investment to the total write-off is decreased on a per year basis.
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flow. In fact, if one does the arithmetic for some offering circulars, one
may be surprised at the actual price of some deals. If the limited part-
ners are allocated only 80 percent of the taxable losses, for example,
one should consider that they are purchasing only 80 percent of the
mortgage; accordingly, the price should be measured based on 80 per-,
cent of the mortgage and not on the entire amount of the mortgage.
The stronger the guarantees made by the general partners, the high-
er the price. A guarantee against default of the mortgage for a period
of five years following the permanent loan closing and, perhaps, sub-
ordination of the management fee (assuming the general partners con-
trol the management company) to the cash flow set forth in the projec-
tions, is worth a premium to the limited partners.5 7 Without appro-
priate guarantees, however, the deal may not be worthwhile at any
price. This is a function of risk and one must weigh many factors in
determining whether a lower price is worth the risks involved because
of the lack of guarantees by the general partner.
One final comment about the price: In a subsidized project, and
probably in every deal, there is a price at which the deal will be un-
economical whether considered from a tax benefit or from an economic
gain point of view. Even if a deal were to be guaranteed by a large
bank against default for 20 years following completion of the project,
the deal may be uneconomical if the price is 23 or 24 percent of the
mortgage in the case of a straight subsidized housing project (a non-
rehabilitation project). In my opinion, as an absolute maximum, one
should never pay more than 21 or 22 percent of the mortgage to par-
ticipate in a subsidized project.
G. Some Absolutes in Tax Shelter Projects
First, the limited partners in the aggregate should receive 90 to 99
percent of the total tax losses available over the first 20 years of the
project.5 I do not want to address myself at this point to the tax ques-
tions which may or may not be present in the "flip-flop" situation where-
by the losses allocated to the limited partners are reduced to a lesser
percentage at some later point in time. Even if the limited partners are
allocated only 70 or 80 percent of the tax losses in a subsidized project,
these losses should persist for at least 20 years. As I stated previously,
in a subsidized project these losses will continue (although at a decreas-
ing rate) for a period of 18 to 20 years after the first year of investment;
thus, it is imperative that the tax benefits be made available to the
limited partners for that entire period of time. If the general partner
insists on a substantial part of the tax losses after the first ten years in a
subsidized project, I would not let an investor participate in that deal.
-" The purpose of the guarantee is not to assure the investor return of his investment
at or about that time. Rather, the guarantee is to provide comfort to the investor that operat-
ing deficits of the project, which are most likely to occur in the early years of the project, will
be totally (or substantially) funded by the general partner.
5 E.g., Schedule A, wherein each of 22 limited partners receives 4.5 percent of the
losses; in total they receive 99 percent of the losses.
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Upon refinancing or sale of the project, the limited partners should
get back their cash investment 9 prior to the general partner. This
assumes, of course, that there are cash proceeds received on such sale
or refinancing in excess of the mortgage balance. 60 It is appropriate,
however, for the limited partners to have this priority reduced by any
cash distribution received by them to the date of such refinancing or
sale.6"' Typically, any cash proceeds received in excess of the priority
to the limited partners are divided between the general partner and the
limited partners on a more or less equal basis.
Disclosed somewhere in the offering circular of all subsidized tax
shelter projects should be the estimated amount of tax the limited part-
ners will have to pay upon, sale of the project, assuming a price of one
dollar above the mortgage balance with a disposition 20 to 22 years
after the project has commenced. One should be suspicious of sub-
sidized projects, in particular, which use a sale price in excess of one
dollar 62 because such an assumption inflates the rate of return.
H. Tax Considerations
Recently, the government has successfully challenged the deducti-
bility of large guaranteed payments,63 "management" fees, and simi-
lar costs.6 4  I believe there may be some justification in allocating part
of the syndication proceeds to a rent-up fee or management payment
to the general partners; I do not believe, however, such allocation
should exceed 15 or 20 percent of the equity proceeds from the limited
partners. If one reviews a deal syndicated today which has a guaran-
teed payment of 50 percent or more of the total equity proceeds, one
would obviously advise the client not to invest in it. There is no wis-
dom in buying what I consider to be a certain lawsuit that will surely
end up a loser.6 5 Moreover, one should look carefully at the explana-
tion behind any guaranteed payment or rent-up fee to satisfy himself that
the terms of the services to be performed by the general partner qualify
as current deductions.6 6
59 I.e., original equity invested minus cash disbursements made prior to the sale or
refinancing.
60 In discussing subsidized projects, one source suggests that "operating costs in these
projects almost always exceed those projected at the outset, with the result that investors
have realized little or no current cash flow and no economic recovery on a disposition of
the project .. " Calkins & Updegraft, Tax Shelters, 26 TAX LAw. 493, 508 (1973).
61 Be sure, however, that this priority includes, in addition to the original investment,
all cumulative unpaid cash distributions originally projected to be made to the limited
partners.
62 Even if only one dollar in excess of the mortgage balance is realized upon sale of the
project, there will be capital gains payable to the extent that the mortgage balance exceeds
the limited partner's basis in the project. See Rev. Rul. 66-94, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 166.
6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 707(c).
64 See, e.g., Edward T. Pratt, 64 T.C. No. 17 (May 8, 1975); Jackson E. Cagle, Jr., 63
T.C. 86 (1974). See also Hewitt & Pennell (eds.), Inconsistencies Between Treatment of
Interest and Guaranteed Payments Explored, 44 J. OF TAX. 95 (1976).
6' See Edward T. Pratt, 64 T.C. No. 17 (May 8, 1975); Jackson E. Cagle, Jr., 63 T.C.
86 (1974).
66 See Weidner, supra note 2, at 928.
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I always review carefully the depreciation schedule set forth in the
financial projections to determine the aggressiveness (if any) of the
persons preparing the projections. In my opinion, high-rise building
shells, if depreciated by the component method 67 of depreciation,
should never have a life of less than 40 years and, in the case of frame
garden apartment projects, the structural shell life should never be less
than 33 1/3 years. Overall composite rates, if component lives are
used, should not be less than 80 percent of shell lives although you will
likely get an argument from the Internal Revenue Service if the overall
composite rate is anything less than the life designated in Revenue
Procedure 62-216 or under ADR. 69
I also review the projections for nondeductible items, such as syndi-
cation fees70 and FNMA or GMNA fees in excess of one percent.7' Pay-
ments to general partners for making guarantees against default,
acquisition costs, and construction supervision fees are also not cur-
rently deductible although they may very properly constitute part of
the depreciable base. I would add that although deduction of any of
the above makes me suspicious of the projections, I may not necessarily
reject the deal unless the total amount of such items is so significant
that it destroys my confidence in the overall projections contained in
the offering circular.
IV. EVALUATING THE DEAL
A. Pay-Back Period
The pay-back period is the period of time over which an investor will
recover his investment. Some offering circulars indicate the pay-back
period by reference to each individual annual installment the investor
is making, whereas others indicate the entire period over which the last
dollar of the investor's payments will be recovered based on the pro-
jections. In any event, in a subsidized project, the investor should gen-
erally recover his investment no later than the end of the fifth year.
Consequently, a deal which recovers the entire investment at the end of
the fourth year is a particularly good deal whereas one that recovers the
investment at the end of the sixth year may be a mediocre deal. Such a
67 Component depreciation is a method of depreciation whereby the building's com-
ponents (e.g., carpeting, furnace, wiring) are depreciated separately from the building shell.
Since these items usually have shorter useful lives than the shell, the use of this method
allows faster overall depreciation than if the building is merely depreciated as a whole.
See G. Robinson, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE § 15.01[1] (rev. ed. 1974).
6 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 418.
69 Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 721.
70 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-214, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 23, at 9, which states that a
limited partnership's payments to one of its general partners for services rendered in or-
ganizing the partnership constitute capital expenditures under Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 263 and thus are not deductible under section 162.
7' According to Rev. Rul. 74-395, 1974-2 Cum. BULL. 45, the one percent portion of this
fee is deductible as interest under Internal Revenue Code section 163(a) and, therefore,
subject to Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 76. The author takes vigorous exception to
this ruling since it involves a conclusion of fact that such fee is interest -when, in fact, it is not.
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deal, however, may have something else in its favor which may warrant
recommending it favorably to the investor. Another point regarding the
payback period is that if the period for recovery of the total investment
is two or three years, I would be suspicious of the projections and ex-
amine it even more closely. Such returns are usually too good to be true.
On Schedule B, note that in the column headed "Cumulative Cash
Benefit," the sum of $35,290 (the total purchase price for one limited
partnership unit) is reached somewhere in 1979, i.e., between the fourth
and fifth years. This is somewhat misleading. Simple interpolation of
the cumulative cash benefit at the end of years 1978 and 1979 would
indicate the recovery of $35,290 is accomplished no later than October
1979, and probably closer to June or July. This is, at the maximum,
four years from the date of the initial investment, October 1975. Thus,
one must consider the actual date the first installment is required to be
paid when determining the pay-back period. 72 One should also consider
how much cash flow contributes to the recovery of the investment. In
this Schedule, approximately $4,000 of cash flow is required to reach
the $38,645 of total cash benefits at the end of 1979. Even if the cash
flow were not generated, the pay-back period would not likely exceed
four years.
B. Return on Investment
The Return on Investment Schedule (Schedule C) usually discloses
the after-tax rate of return on the investment. This computation distills
all the important numbers applicable to the project into an annual rate
which takes into account the timing of the installment payments by the
investor as well as the timing of the tax deductions. This after-tax rate
of return on investment is a true measurement of the time-value of
money and is comparable with other after-tax rates of return, such as
the return on a municipal bond or the return on a corporate bond after
provision for personal taxes on the interest.
In my judgment, a subsidized project which discloses an after-tax
rate of return of less than 15 percent is probably overpriced and is not
worth the investment. Generally, I like to see an after-tax rate of re-
turn on a subsidized project of 19 or 20 percent. I think that 22 or 23
percent, or greater, is a very good deal. There are, however, some
circumstances which warrant investing in a subsidized project with a
lower than 19 or 20 percent rate of return. For example, it is possible
that the projections are very conservatively prepared or that the low
rate of return may carry with it substantial guarantees by strong general
partners. Such low risk/low rate of return projects may be appealing
when your particular investor is exceptionally conservative.
The Return on Investment Schedule also discloses the recovery of
72 Thus, the investment in this case is not actually recovered over a five-year period
as would seem to appear from the Schedule, since the interval between the first invest-
ment in October 1975, and recovery in 1979, is only 48, not 60 months. This results only
because the first year investment is made in October 1975, rather than January or Feb-
ruary 1975.
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the investment, and the investment balance. These schedules often con-
tain a sinking fund which begins somewhere around the eleventh year
and continues until the end of the schedule, usually about the twentieth
year. The purpose of this is to demonstrate that the tax benefits from
years 11 onward (assuming that such benefits are reinvested at a tax-
free income rate of four percent) must be set aside to pay the capital
gains tax on disposition of the property at the end of the twentieth year
of the project - even if the project is sold at a price one dollar above the
then existing mortgage balance. This schedule is very complicated
and I would only mention here that its purpose in your hands should be
primarily to compare one deal with another.
C. Out-of-Pocket Exposure (Liquidity Factor)
Usually there will be a schedule in the projections which discloses
the cumulative effect of the combined benefits of tax savings73 and
cash flow 74 versus the amount of the investment7 5 on an annual basis.
From this one will be able to determine the maximum out-of-pocket
exposure76 to the investor. For instance, if the total investment re-
quired to be paid over a five year period by an investor is $50,000, and
on a cumulative basis the investor is never out-of-pocket more than
$5,000, then the out-of-pocket exposure is only ten percent of the total
investment amount - a very safe exposure.
77
In conjunction with the "out-of-pocket exposure," one must con-
sider the liquidity factor. In the example above, I considered the in-
vestor's maximum liqudity factor to be $5,000 in the particular project
(and that is usually only for a short period of time). Nevertheless,
investors will complain that they do not want to tie up $30,000 or
$40,000 to purchase a limited partnership unit in a particular project,
because they do not want to reduce their portfolio liquidity by such an
amount. My position is that since the investment is made substantially
from tax savings, liquidity is not an important consideration in a prop-
erly structured tax shelter project. It is not as if the investor were writ-
ing a check or cashing a certificate of deposit to make the investment.
Although this may be true for a short period of time, the payment of a
particular installment by an investor will usually be recouped quickly
from tax savings due to lower estimated tax payments. 78 Liquidity
should, therefore, be of little or no consequence in a well structured
deal.
13 See Schedule B, Column (3) and accompanying explanation.
11 See Schedule B, Column (4) and accompanying explanation.
15 See Schedule B, Column (7) and accompanying explanation.
76 See Schedule B, Column (8) and accompanying explanation.
17 Schedule B, Column (8) shows that for that deal the investor has an out-of-pocket
investment in only one year, 1977. In all other years the total benefits exceed the total
investment.
7s Quarterly estimated tax payments are required for certain individuals by sections
6015 and 6153 of the Internal Revenue Code.
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D. Timing of the Deal
A project which commences construction in the early part of the
year usually affords more tax shelter in the first year than a deal which
starts in the latter part of the year. A deal which has a tax loss per
limited partnership unit of $3,000 in year one, $14,000 in year two, and
$12,000 in year three represents a deal that should be syndicated in
the second year and not in the first year. Unless the deal is excep-
tional, there is no point in putting the investor into the deal unless the
first year tax shelter is significant in relation to the second year shelter.
To me, this means that the first year tax shelter should be no less than
40 percent of the amount of tax shelter available in the second year.
I would also point out that in a deal starting very late in the year, one
should carefully examine the tax deductions for the first year to make
sure that they are legitimate and not "padded" with questionable de-
ductions in order to make it syndicable in the first year simply be-
cause the project has had an "initial loan closing" with HUD (FHA).
E. Front-End Load
I believe one does the investor a disservice if one is concerned about
the division of the syndication proceeds between the developer and the
syndicator. Whether the syndicator gets ten or twenty percent of the
syndication proceeds is not terribly relevant - what is important is the
total price paid by the investor, the recovery period of the invest-
ment, and the after-tax rate of return. There may be many reasons
which justify the syndicator receiving more than ten percent of the
syndication proceeds in a particular deal. For example, the syndicator
could have helped obtain the mortgage financing or could have helped
in the initial structuring of the deal before the time he would ordinarily
have become involved. On the other hand, there is no justification
for entering into a deal which does not yield a suitable rate of return.
F. Payback of Tax Benefits Upon Disposition
I have pointed out that the use of money is the raison d'etre for in-
vesting in a tax shelter. If the period during which money is made
available for reinvestment by an investor is significant, it is unimpor-
tant that a substantial part of the tax benefits generated by the deal
have to be repaid 9 to the Treasury upon disposition of that project.
First, the investor will probably have converted a significant amount of
ordinary income into capital gain.80 Secondly, the investor should
have realized a large return on reinvestment of the tax savings. Ad-
'9 See Schedule C-5O percent, line 15 and the accompanying explanation.
80 Depreciation deductions will reduce ordinary income but upon disposition of the
property (assuming the property has been held long enough to avoid the recapture provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code) the proceeds are taxed not as ordinary income, but as
capital gain under Internal Revenue Code section 1231. In any event, the straight line
depreciation and construction period expenses are taxed as capital gain regardless of when
the disposition occurs.
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ditionally, when the tax benefits are paid back to the Treasury after 20
years or so, they are probably paid back with dollars that are worth, at
an inflation rate of only three percent, less than half of the tax savings
realized from the project. Thus, there is a very real "in pocket" savings to
the investor resulting from the use of money provided by a long-term
tax shelter investment.
V. CONCLUSION
I hope that my remarks will be helpful in evaluating tax shelter in-
vestments proposed by one's client. I know that, theoretically, pro-
fessionals are only asked to render tax and accounting advice to their
clients. It -is an inescapable fact, however, that the client relies on the
judgment and experience of accountants and attorneys when making an
investment decision. It is also a fact that few accountants and few
attorneys have the depth of expertise to analyze an offering circular,
which is very long and very complex. Although I could have expanded
my comments on many of the points I have covered and discussed
some others which may be helpful in the less traditional deal, I believe
that the basic points which I have treated are the most significant fac-
tors that must be considered when evaluating the most common kind of
deal one is likely to see. At the very least, if one is going to advise a
client to accept or reject an investment in a proposed tax shelter, I hope
that I have provided the basis with which to make a well-informed judg-
ment.
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SCHEDULE C-50 PERCENT
RETURN ON INVESTMENT SCHEDULE
FOR RATE OF RETURN OF 28.12 PERCENT
LIMITED PARTNER IN 50 PERCENT TAX BRACKET
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Annual
Cash
Year Benefit
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
8880
9136
8325
6503
5802
5100
4470
4215
4240
4607
4508
3974
3509
3113
2710
2301
1887
1983
1818
1393
Return on
Investment
@ 28.12
percent
2432
3215
4081
3360
2949
2620
2396
2285
1743
1041
38
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Return
of
Investment
6447
5921
4245
3143
2853
2480
2074
1930
2497
3567
134
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital Investment
Contribution Balance
8650 2203
9230 5512
9000 10267
1682 8807
1682 7636
1682 6838
1682 6446
1682 6198
0 3701
0 134
0 (4512)
0 (8829)
0 (12836)
0 (16593)
0 (20083)
0 (23288)
0 (26192)
0 (29313)
0 (32389)
0 (35147)
88473 26159 35290
(8) Tax Losses
(9) Cash Distributions
(10) Proceeds of Sale
(11) Less: Investment
(12) Capital Gain
(13) Capital Gains Tax (.30)
(14) Less: Proceeds of Sale
(15) Cash Needed to Pay Capital Gains Tax
127950
24498
1
152449
35290
117159
35148
1
35147
Notes:
The annual rate of return on investment was calculated assuming that an
investor limited partner would sell his partnership interest at the end of year 20
for one dollar. For 50 percent and 60 percent tax bracket taxpayers, some of the
cash generated in year 11 and all of the cash generated in years 12 to 20, will
be set aside to pay the capital gains tax which will result from the sale. In
calculating the rate of return it was assumed income would be earned on any
cash set aside for this purpose at an after-tax rate of four percent a year com-
pounded semi-annually.
Earnings
on
Surplus
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SCHEDULE D-60 PERCENT
RETURN ON INVESTMENT SCHEDULE
FOR RATE OF RETURN OF 41.37 PERCENT
LIMITED PARTNER IN 60 PERCENT TAX BRACKET
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Annual
Cash
Year Benefit
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
10656
10963
9718
7531
6691
5847
5091
4786
4816
5256
5138
4497
3939
3463
2980
2489
1992
2107
1910
1400
Return on
Investment
@ 41.37
percent
3578
4469
5505
4459
3883
3418
3109
2984
2239
1173
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Return
of
Investment
7077
6494
4213
3072
2807
2429
1983
1802
2577
2836
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital
Contribu-
tion
8650
9230
9000
1682
1682
1682
1682
1682
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Investment
Balance
1573
4309
9096
7706
6581
5833
5532
5413
2836
(1298)
(6696)
(11644)
(16213)
(20471)
(24398)
(27973)
(31176)
(34627)
(38013)
(41005)
Earnings
on
Surplus
50
260
452
630
795
947
1086
1211
1345
1476
1592
101268 34818 35290
(8) Tax Losses
(9) Cash Distributions
(10) Proceeds of Sale
(11) Less: Investment
(12) Capital Gain
(13) Capital Gains Tax (.35)
(14) Less: Proceeds of Sale
(15) Cash Needed to Pay Capital Gains Tax
127950
24498
1
152449
35290
117159
41006
1
41005
Notes:
The annual rate of investment was calculated assuming that an investor
limited partner would sell his partnership interest at the end of year 20 for one
dollar. For 50 percent and 60 percent tax bracket taxpayers, some of the cash
generated in year 10 and all of the cash generated in years 11 to 20, will be set
aside to pay the capital gains tax which will result from the sale. In calculating
the rate of return it was assumed income would be earned on any cash set aside
for this purpose at an after-tax rate of four percent a year compounded semi-
annually.
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